Lamenting the outcome of the war in Iraq which he had initially
supported, a friend commented on former White House Press Secretary
Scott McClellan’s remark in his book What Happened: Inside the Bush
White House, that the Iraq invasion had been a serious strategic
blunder. My friend asked in rhetorical fashion, what could possibly be
worse from a national security standpoint than for a war to go
unexpectedly sour after such a promising beginning? I innocently
replied, probably starting one that never should have been waged to
begin with. As if I had not made a startling revelation--which I had
not--he added, sure, but how can we tell when it is justified to go to
war?This question has no clear-cut answer but various ones
depending on specific circumstances. But with regard to the invasion of
Iraq, I think we can assert that the most significant intangible
element that makes this question so seemingly easy to address is that
the American people, the Congress, and the media overwhelmingly
supported this war.It is interesting that, while we continue to
support the war in Afghanistan even though it is not going all that
well, we have expressed strong disapproval, even revulsion, toward our
involvement in Iraq. Is it that we have made a late-coming moral
distinction between the two? On what basis, and relying on what
criteria?Setting aside for the moment the question of whether
our moral compass does or does not need realignment, given its
destructive capability, questions about war always should require a
moral answer. After all, we call ourselves a moral nation and we remind
the world that we behave morally.It is one of McClellan’s other
remarks, however, that brings out the moral element to the forefront of
the war in Iraq. Clearly questioning the justification for the war now,
he concludes that, war should only be waged when necessary, and the
Iraq war was not necessary.Not that McClellan brought forth any
wisdom to the discussion. After all, how do we determine when is it
necessary to wage war? The term necessary may include various motives,
good and bad ones according to different definitions of what the
national interest should be, including some having noble yet
imperialistic and messianic designs.Certainly, the fact that
the war in Iraq has not gone as well as the Bush administration had
expected should have no bearing on whether or not the war was
necessary. That would be as absurd as when the Bush Administration
argued that the initial invasion was justified based on how easily US
troops defeated the Iraqi army. Losing a war does not change its
initial moral justification any more than winning should justify an
immoral military venture.As the war in Iraq goes on with no
clear end in sight, the timing is ripe to discuss under what
circumstances and on account of which reasons and motives should wars
be fought at all. For example, given that we are having second thoughts
about the invasion of Iraq, we may want to ask ourselves if something
similar could happen again. Are there new deterrents today that were
absent in 2003 that could prevent other strategic blunders? Lastly, how
would the president intends to manage conflict and how would his views
affect US policy?We know that presidents as Commanders in Chief
of the Armed Forces have constitutional powers that allow them to
conduct war. And, while they technically require congressional
approval, sometimes presidents have successfully managed to evade such
consent.Despite these powers, given the American people's
dislike for wars, presidents seek—and need--public support to start
and/or to continue military ventures. Such unwritten constitutional
limitations on presidents means that, when it comes to waging a war,
the American people have extraordinary political power over their
Commanders in Chief, should they decide to exercise it. We may then
conclude that the United States fights wars because the American people
either support or condone them; and that we are the ultimate and only
emergency brake inside the military vehicle.Still, how would
the American people go about deciding whether to grant approval to a
specific military venture? Today, as some groups seek ways to rein in
the executive’s ability to run over an incapable Congress on the use of
the military, it becomes apparent that the American people (as well as
both institutions) are in need of relatively specific and clear moral
criteria--an ethos—that could guide presidents and Congress in their
decisions to conduct war.I discussed at length what
traditionally constitutes criteria for a Just War in chapters 11, 12,
and part of chapter 14 of my book that appears in this website. These
criteria are readily consistent with various religious views as well as
with secular and atheistic ethics.At its core, the essence of
the Just War criteria lies in the value, the significance, of innocent
human life and the proposition that no one innocent human life is more
or less important than others. Ironically, it is precisely because of
the moral strength of this proposition that war sometimes need to be
fought--to defend innocent human life.The Just War criteria
presumes the existence of evil in human nature and the possibility that
bad people would want to do bad things to innocent beings, something
that could require a morally justifiable act of self-defense. This
viewpoint has an inevitably moral political dimension: the need to
safeguard the national security of the state which means that, at
times, the state may have to wage war to protect the safety of its
citizens and their way of life.The Just War criteria also serve
to prevent well-intentioned leaders from committing serious strategic
blunders by distinguishing between morally justifiable action, such as
a Defensive War (a war fought following an attack against our land and
our people or in defense of an innocent nation being attacked by an
outside enemy or slaughtered by its own leaders), and its corollary, a
Preemptive War (according to the Pentagon, military action that is
initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy
attack is imminent), and what is now universally condemned as a
political, legal, and morally irresponsible course of action, a
Preventive War (one that is initiated in the belief that military
conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable).Preventive Wars
are gambles political leaders take to eliminate potential threats that
may or may not materialize. These gambles are typically the result of
unexamined fear, insecurity, domestic political calculations,
inadequate intelligence, shallow policy analysis, misguided moral
principles, absence of morally-based national security policies, and
failure by social and political institutions to question war policies.
McClellan’s remarks about the war in Iraq point out the presence of
these deficiencies among political, military, and social leaders,
including McClellan himself.Relying on Preventive Wars as an
instrument of foreign policy voids an essential aspect of a legal and
moral code that has taken centuries to root into the international mind
and which has been used by the United States itself to condemn other
states. Such reliance removes an important element that differentiates
between rogue and law-abiding states, thereby eliminating the
proverbial high road that so often we claim to take. By sanctioning
this instrument of policy we tacitly give the green light to other
states to follow suit. Under such unstable conditions, what could
prevent misguided or unjustified wars from happening?Nationwide
moral justification made possible military action against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan as well as the invasion of Iraq. But while such
justification has not been largely questioned in the Afghan case, it
has practically eroded in Iraq. If the American people had not extended
their support to the war in Iraq, it is likely that the Bush
administration’s intention to invade Iraq would not have materialized.
Somehow, we were not able to distinguish between the two military
events.Quite possibly, the American people have not yet
realized that the Iraqi invasion was a Preventive, not a Preemptive,
war. It was presented as preemptive because of ineptitude within the
political leadership or on account of deception; however, when
evaluated against its criteria, the Iraqi invasion meets the elements
of a Preventive War. Such distinction is crucial. Possibly, Scott
McClellan might have had these differences belatedly in mind when he
wrote that, wars should only be waged when necessary.Are there
deterrents in place today that would prevent other similar strategic
blunders? Hardly. There is no denying that our political leaders on
both sides of the aisle care deeply about the security of the American
people; and neither group are appeasers, if by this we mean the
surrender of our strategic interests for the overall sake of avoiding
war.The problem is that politicians seek to safeguard the
nation’s interests while under extraordinary self-imposed pressure to
be elected or re-elected into office. And in the absence of ethos and
principles dictating that war should only be approached as a last
resort and in a defensive manner, it is likely that once fear and
insecurity show their faces our leaders might not be able to prudently
handle an upcoming threat.Politicians’ desire to get elected
into high office quite often makes them do and say awkward things in
order to cater to those whose votes they badly want to get. They know
that in a dangerous world voters want to be reassured that their lives,
and their way of life, will be protected above anything else; that they
will not lack oil; that there will not be another 9/11; that their
children will have grandchildren. Politicians need to reassure voters
that no possible international threat will impinge into their happiness.On
the other hand, in their eagerness to reassure voters, one may want to
question the extent to which our political leaders are sensitive to how
their electoral rhetoric shapes the domestic public’s expectations as
well as foreign leaders’ perceptions of US behavior. Are they aware
that their positions unnecessarily might constrain their choices once
they are elected that in turn may inhibit them from considering more
diplomatic alternatives that could reduce self-induced conflicts that
result in war or political instability?Meanwhile, the American
voter faces a dilemma--not unlike other peoples worldwide—that leads
politicians to an electorally safe position. We tend to be peacefully
oriented; but while we dislike war, we will not shy away from resorting
to military action when our interests—and above all, our security and
that of our allies—are threatened. There is another dimension to this
dilemma, one that, again, is shared by other cultures: we call
ourselves the land of the brave. A consequence of this attribution is
that we detest being perceived as cowards.This means that in
the political arena, on issues pertaining to the national security, we
want to be seen--understandably so--as forceful and assertive not weak
or delicate. So while the security of the nation should always trump
other considerations that are less vital than life itself, given how we
feel about our interests and about ourselves, political rhetoric will
tend to magnify existing threats or even create new ones regardless of
their credibility. Having to choose between being a warmonger or an
appeaser becomes an easy choice. Ignoring the possibility of various
other attitudes, politicians likely will end up choosing to act like a
Wild West's Wyatt Earp over TV’s Mr. Rogers.The above dilemma,
however, encloses a bit of a problem: an aggressive stance in foreign
policy begins to show its face as our collective fears become public.
These are fears we sense individually as well as those that are
instilled into us by our politicians portraying themselves as our
protectors.The outcome of this dilemma, I think, has propelled
us into accepting, almost by default, subconsciously perhaps, the
primacy of a Preventive War mentality in our foreign policy.This
frame of mind is clearly observed in the 2008 Republican presidential
candidate, John McCain. He not only endorsed President Bush’s invasion
of Iraq, he did so while sharing Bush’s preventive view of the world as
well as most of the superficial assumptions that were generated by
poorly analyzed intelligence that went largely unquestioned by a
congressional majority. McCain became critical of the war in Iraq once
it was revealed that the US had committed major intelligence and
militarily logistical blunders, following increases in casualties, and
after it became publicly obvious that the war was not going to end
according to Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s
original timetable.Thus, Senator McCain’s credibility as a
critic of the war lies only in that his criticism was voiced as a
Republican against his own party’s leader. Most of Senator McCain’s
statements regarding potential threats in Iran, Pakistan, or North
Korea, Muslim and Arab radicalism, international terrorism, or his
views concerning other areas such as Cuba and Venezuela, or even his
comments on Russia’s political project and Vladimir Putin, were
characterized by a Preventive War mentality that is devoid of any
serious analysis and historical perspective. In addition, his Iraq
war-ending strategy was primarily a blank check on President Bush’s
stay the course military solution, without taking into account other
more positive diplomatic and political objectives in the region.Regarding
the invasion of Iraq, as a senator, Barack Obama had a completely
different viewpoint; he opposed it prior to its beginning. Although he
did not voice his criticism in 2002 in terms of waging a Preventive
War, Obama outlined certain criteria—some in moral terms--that
otherwise could have justified the invasion. He regarded Iraq as a war
of choice; one that he did not deem necessary under the circumstances
at the time, describing the invasion as a rash war based not on reason
but on passion, not on principle but on politics.Nonetheless,
along with many who today oppose the Iraq invasion, as president, Obama
initially was bent on the assumption that to right a wrong one simply
needed to do the complete opposite of the initial wrongful action. If
the invasion was morally or politically irresponsible, he assumed that
an immediate timetabled withdrawal would be the appropriate choice of
policy. Despite his continuous refinements to his view, implementation
of this policy fails to take into account our own moral responsibility
to repair the damage we brought upon the Iraqi people as well as to
ward off potential negative outcomes of our withdrawal in the region
and to the security of our allies and our people. In other words, we
have to worry that an untimely, non-strategically oriented retreat
(both retreat and withdrawal are synonyms), can be as morally and
politically reckless as initiating a war based on passion instead of
reason.To his credit, Obama seems to believe, more than McCain
did, that war is a last recourse after considerable diplomatic efforts
have failed. And yet, his political rhetoric, thus, his policy room to
maneuver, was somewhat hampered by his political need to be elected.Recalling
his flag pin backpedaling, Obama found it initially difficult to
articulate a morally coherent national security strategy because his
Republican counterpart, compelled also to cater to the electorate’s
fears and insecurities and his desire not to be perceived as coward,
kept reminding him that a good president must sound and appear
confrontational and intimidating.Addressing situations in
Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and also in relation to Israel’s
enemies, Obama found himself walking on a political tightrope,
carefully crafting an image of an assertive warrior in order to avoid
being perceived as an appeaser.Induced by a mixture of
electoral politics, our insecurities, and our self-perception, our
current war ethos call on relying on the so-called Cowboy diplomacy,
the current version of the old Gunboat diplomacy that depends on the
use or threat of military force as a primary means to attain our
objectives abroad.The political necessity to pay homage to the
electorate’s Preventive mentality has eroded elements of traditional
diplomacy, by this meaning the skills that political leaders require to
conduct their relations without arousing hostility. As a result, both
McCain and Obama were relying on a Preventive approach to diplomacy,
thus creating or exacerbating existing fears and threats, without
realizing that the warmonger is just as dangerous to peace and security
as the appeaser.Despite that we are a militarily and
economically powerful nation, we seem to need to speak down to other
nations and their leaders. We are not aware that, at the other end, our
tone often is perceived as being paternalistic and arrogant and
reminiscent of imperialistic policies. We speak publicly in terms of
regime change; we tend not to ask or persuade others but to demand; we
threaten others with sanctions if they fail to behave the way we ask
them and offer them rewards if they do. Our relationship with
our enemies or with those who disagree with our policies exhibits
traits of the father-son, teacher-pupil, boss-worker, master-servant
types. Somehow, we are not sensitive to the fact that peoples and their
leaders worldwide take offense to such rhetoric even though it plays
well in the eyes of the American electorate. We may not even notice
that many of the leaders with whom we currently have conflict resent
this rhetoric and that their defiant behavior--and policies--can be a
reaction to our condescending attitude. As leaders, they seek to
protect their images and oppose us in order not to appear before their
people and the rest of the world as caving in to our demands.To
his credit, and feeling more confident after having been elected
president, Obama seems to be projecting a more diplomatic behavior than
Bush ever did, to the point where he is arousing anguish and disbelief
on the part of those who belittle this approach. While not a dove, he
is posed to rely more on traditional diplomacy as a means to solve
conflicts. United States' poorly examined insecurities could, however,
at any time overblow the magnitude of existing threats. Unless fully
aware of this tendency, these threats could lead Obama to employ a more
confrontational rhetoric to avoid being perceived as weak and
inexperienced. Such rhethoric could lead him to stray away from the
diplomatic path. For, diplomacy is like walking on a tight rope but
without the pole and, unfortunately, keeping one's balance is never
assured.Today, there is nothing on the horizon that guarantees
that our next military venture might not be a repetition of the Iraq
blunder. Part of the problem lies in the dynamics of how to deal with
enemies assertively and confidently without projecting the image of—or
being—an appeaser. As powerful as we are, we have not mastered this
technique. As a nation, we believe that the threat or use of military
power is the only way to project respect. We confuse bravado with
bravery, seemingly unaware that bravado suggests being foolhardy, while
bravery is a distant cousin of the term barbarous, which means
uncivilized and wild. In between there lie the terms courage, mettle,
resolve, attitudes that project self-assurance without discarding the
possibility of having to wage a Just War in self-defense or in the
defense of others.Contact the author: Author@jricardoplanas.com.
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